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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a theory of economic freedom. In
this endeavor, we build our framework on the Hayekian notion of freedom (Hayek, 1960) because
it explicitly embodies the obvious link between freedom and the state: freedom is an absence of
state coercion except for that which enforces abstract, general rules known beforehand. We derive
two propositions from this Hayekian thesis and elaborate on them, leading to a categorization of
government actions from the viewpoint of economic freedom in which the criterion against which
coercive governmental actions must be evaluated is the rule of law, meaning a government’s
reliance on general, abstract rules. As an implication, our framework allows us to argue for the
imperative differentiation between “efficiency” and “economic freedom” as two separate criteria
against which government actions can and must be evaluated. We also show that our framework
may help explain the process through which economic freedom enhances growth.
KEYWORDS: economic freedom, government, coercion, Hayek
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 1. Introduction 
 
Since Adam Smith, who was the first to explicitly raise the importance of a 
system of natural liberty1 (in modern parlance economic freedom), the issue of 
economic freedom has been a subject of little interest among economists, except 
for Hayek (1960); however, over the past 15 years the concept of economic 
freedom has attracted more attention.2 This is due to the construction of two 
widely used indexes of economic freedom3. Using these indexes, a growing body 
of empirical research analyzing the role of economic freedom on growth has 
emerged, whose major finding is that economic freedom raises long-run income 
or growth (e.g., Easton and Walker, 1997; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; Gwartney et 
al., 2004, 2006). 
However, beyond the well-documented argument that economic freedom 
increases growth, this line of the literature cannot provide an exact answer to the 
question of how and why economic freedom enhances growth or long-run income, 
a question which is related to today’s most pressing economic problem, namely 
why some countries grow while others do not. In addition, the why and how 
question is in general reduced to asking which components of an economic 
freedom index contribute to growth to the greatest extent (see e.g., Carlsson and 
Lundström, 2002; Dawson, 2003). What, at the most fundamental level, prevents 
the empirical literature from developing a new dynamism in investigating 
economic freedom’s growth-enhancing effect is that even despite the existence of 
the economic freedom indexes and their extensive use in various empirical 
investigations, a theory of economic freedom itself is still missing; a theory that, 
most importantly, must also include an explanation for the how and why question. 
                                                 
1 Where “[e]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to 
pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition 
with those of any other man, or order of men” (Smith, 1776, Book Four, Chapter IX). Available: 
http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-b4-c9.htm. Accessed January 5, 2010. 
2 Before Adam Smith described a consistent system of natural liberty, many other scholars 
recognized different aspects of the beneficial effect of economic freedom. The most distant 
predecessors to Smith may be the scholars of the School of Salamanca, who worked mainly in the 
16th century (Grice-Hutchison, 1952; Rothbard, 2006:101-116). They originally developed several 
ideas which later became reinvented as the building blocks of laissez-faire thinking. In particular, 
they were aware of the working mechanism of demand and supply, and developed a theory of 
natural law that was explicitly connected with the (perhaps more theological than economic) 
question of the free will of man and with a commitment to freedom (Rothbard, 2006:115-116). We 
are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this school. 
3 These indexes are: the one developed by the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) Index; for the most recent version see Gwartney and Lawson, 2009), and another 
constructed by the Heritage Foundation jointly with the Wall Street Journal (Index of Economic 
Freedom; for the most recent version see Miller and Holmes, 2009). 
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 Even Block (2006), one of the fathers of the EFW Index, acknowledges 
that the construction of the index was largely driven by operational and 
measurement considerations, rather than with the intention of deriving a theory of 
economic freedom or of its effects. This is, however, not to say that the indexes 
are not grounded on clear concepts; on the contrary, the EFW Index, for example, 
was developed as a result of a series of conferences in which many distinguished 
scholars, including Nobel Laureates, participated. Scholars at these conferences 
engaged in thorough discussions – and later published their results in books – 
about what economic freedom is and what should be integrated into an index 
designed to measure it (see Walker, 1988; Block, 1991; Easton and Walker, 
1992). But measurement being the primary aim, the EFW Index was not designed 
in such a way as to make it possible to analyze in depth the above questions 
related to the causes and process of economic development.4 
In this paper we do not want to criticize the indexes of economic freedom, 
nor the empirical literature on economic freedom; instead we intend to contribute 
to the development of a theory of economic freedom. Acknowledging that the 
development of the theory of economic freedom is a larger research project, here 
we will lay down only the conceptual framework. 
In our endeavor we were to a large extent inspired and influenced by 
Hayek (1960, 1973). Our starting point is the Hayekian notion of freedom because 
it explicitly embodies the obvious link between freedom and the state, a link 
which is indeed, although mostly implicitly, widely acknowledged by scholars. 
Hayek (1960) defined freedom in terms of state coercion: 
 
Freedom demands no more than that coercion and violence, fraud and 
deception, be prevented, except for the use of coercion by the government 
for the sole purpose of enforcing known rules intended to secure the best 
conditions under which the individual may give his activities a coherent, 
rational pattern. (Hayek, 1960:144) 
 
We derive two important propositions from this Hayekian thesis. First, 
since in the spirit of Hayek, economic freedom and government are not 
antagonistic per se but at the same time government represents the major threat to 
economic freedom, economic freedom is best conceptualized in terms of types of 
government actions. Second, a criterion against which coercive governmental 
                                                 
4 One major issue which is now at the forefront of research is that of the possible endogeneity of 
institutions and policies of economic freedom in the development process (Faria and Montesinos, 
2009). To be able to formulate hypotheses as regards which institutions and policies constituting 
economic freedom are endogenous requires some a priori theorizing about economic freedom 
with this question in mind, but the components currently used in an economic freedom index were 
not constructed with this aim. See also our argumentation in the Conclusions section. 
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 actions have to be evaluated is the rule of law. Here, in its Hayekian meaning, the 
rule of law refers to whether the government enforces only general, abstract rules 
known beforehand, a meaning which is different from seeing the rule of law 
simply as a component of economic freedom as both indexes do (see Section 4). 
As an implication of these two propositions, we will explicitly differentiate 
between freedom-compatible and freedom-non-compatible coercive government 
actions, a distinction which serves as a cornerstone in an explanation of the 
relationship between state, coercion and economic freedom. This framework leads 
us to consider “economic freedom” and “efficiency” as two separate criteria 
against both of which government actions can and must be evaluated. 
We clearly argue that further work is needed; on the one hand, on the 
operationalization of our conceptual framework, which may lead to the 
improvement or possible restructuring of the indexes measuring economic 
freedom, and on the other hand, on various theoretical issues such as the 
connection between economic freedom, entrepreneurship and institutions, which 
may help explain how economic freedom induces growth. It is precisely these two 
paths for further development that underpin the significance of our conceptual 
framework. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will present 
the root ideas concerning economic freedom, namely those of the Scottish 
philosophers of the Enlightenment, and ideas built upon these, namely those of 
English classical economics and Hayek. In Section 3, taking a step forward, we 
will highlight the link between coercion, the state and freedom, and, based on this 
analysis, in Section 4 we will explore the content of economic freedom and its 
relation to the rule of law. In Section 5 we will categorize and analyze 
governmental actions in terms of their relation to economic freedom. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. From the concept of the state of nature to that of economic freedom 
 
The theoretical foundations of Hayek’s views on freedom were developed by the 
Scottish philosophers of the Enlightenment and the English classical economists. 
Although neither Locke and Hume nor Smith used the term “economic freedom” 
explicitly, they developed insights which, in fact, are related to economic 
freedom. 
John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government (Locke, 1690) 
founded a coherent and powerful intellectual tradition, in which he provided the 
first coherent justification for private property as the foundation of social order 
(Rabushka, 1991:27). According to Locke, private property was essential to 
preserve the individual freedom that individuals enjoyed in the state of nature 
which is “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their 
3
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 possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, 
without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man” (Locke, 
1690:106). Based on this, he argued that the primary goal of government is the 
defense of property under the rule of law. In this way, he was arguing for the 
institutions of laissez-faire capitalism where the government’s role was little more 
than a night-watchman’s. David Hume (1739) reinforced Locke’s views. Hume 
was the first to formally identify those institutional characteristics that are 
necessary for promoting the socially beneficial economic behavior of individuals 
(Hayek, 1988:34). These are the recognition of private property rights and the 
application of the rule of law to govern private transactions. 
In fact, both Locke and Hume argued for the type of government that in 
modern parlance is called “limited government”: Locke’s idea was that the proper 
role of the government is to protect the natural rights of individuals, while 
Hume’s view was that the government is legitimate as long as it serves a 
particular purpose, namely securing peace and property rights. The government, 
in the state of nature, cannot act arbitrarily (Locke, 1690). 
All these views are to some extent echoed by scholars in English classical 
economics (e.g., Smith, 1776; Mill, 1860). As mentioned in the previous section, 
Adam Smith recognized the importance of natural liberty (economic freedom) 
more than 200 years ago. In providing an answer to the question of why some 
nations are rich while others are poor he emphasized the role of the system of 
natural liberty (together with that of specialization and exchange), which is, au 
fond, a type of explanation of the effects of economic freedom on growth. Mill’s 
essay (1860) On Liberty was also a very influential work which advocated the 
moral and economic freedom of individuals from the state. In this essay Mill was 
concerned with developing ideas regarding the nature and limits of power that can 
be legitimately exercised over individuals in a society. 
The important lesson to be drawn from the ideas of the above scholars is 
that government and economic freedom are not antagonistic per se. As suggested 
by the idea of “limited government”, government per se is not to be condemned; 
instead, it fulfills some positive roles that cannot be fulfilled by any other actor in 
a society. According to Locke, this role is the defense of private property, in 
Hume’s view this is the application of the rule of law, and in Smith’s (1776) view 
the major role of the government is to provide protection against private coercion 
and to provide public goods. 
After a relatively long silence on the issue of (economic) freedom 
following the emergence of the intellectual tradition described above, Hayek 
(1944[1971], 1960, 1973) was the first to develop an explicit theory on freedom. 
He defined freedom as an absence of state coercion except for that which enforces 
abstract, general rules known beforehand (see the quotation in the previous 
section). This thesis, on the one hand, reinforces what Locke, Hume, Smith and 
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 Mill argued. Hayek also made it clear that government and freedom will only be 
contradictory if government expands beyond certain limits, and what is more, he 
provided us with a criterion to determine these “limits”. This criterion is the rule 
of law, a state under which the government is prevented from acting on an ad hoc 
basis; accordingly where it is possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive power. So in the spirit of the above, we propose to 
translate the Hayekian thesis into two propositions. 
The first is that economic freedom is compatible with government, but not 
with any kind of government.5 Based on this, in order to come closer to a 
conceptualization of economic freedom one should analyze the actions of the 
government according to their character. Accordingly, when it comes to economic 
freedom it is not the size of the government that matters, as is also explicitly 
argued by Hayek (1960:221-224), Mises (1949:279-287) or Pejovich (2008:42), 
but rather what government is allowed to do and how: economic freedom relates 
to the character of government actions, rather than the volume of government 
actions (more details in Section 5). 
The second proposition is that the character of government actions has to 
be evaluated according to whether the government relies on abstract, general rules 
known beforehand when exercising its coercive power or whether the actions are 
arbitrary, a criterion which is embodied in the principles of the rule of law. Thus, 
what the rule of law provides us with is precisely a criterion against which one 
should evaluate the actions of the government from the viewpoint of economic 
freedom. Clearly, in this interpretation, the rule of law is not only a characteristic 
of the legal system; neither is it just one component of economic freedom among 
many others as it is in the indexes of economic freedom (see Gwartney and 
Lawson, 2009, and Miller and Holmes, 2009).6 Instead, here the rule of law 
                                                 
5 By adopting our position we disagree with Rothbard, an influential Libertarian economist, who 
rejects any role for government. In his book of 1962[2004], he developed the feasibility of a 
totally stateless economy, and in his book of 1982[1998] he described the ethical foundations for 
individual liberty. Note also that the view that the state and freedom are not inherently antagonistic 
is not to deny that the state represents a threat to freedom. 
6 To be clear, in this respect it is imperative to distinguish the Hayekian meaning of the rule of law 
from the concept that is very often used in the literature, mainly in econometric investigations in 
which different measures of the rule of law are generally included as an explanatory variable in 
growth regressions. Knack and Keefer (1995) were the first to use measures of the security of 
property rights compiled by country risk rating agencies in terms of the rule of law. Since then a 
huge literature has examined the effect of various measures of the rule of law on economic 
performance. Reviewing this literature, Haggard et al. (2008) showed that the term “rule of law” is 
used to describe very different aspects of the legal system. In many cases it means the security of 
property rights, while in others it refers to the institutional constraints on government, the level of 
corruption, or the independence of the judiciary. These measures, as shown by the review of the 
empirics in Durlauf et al. (2005), are usually found to be a significant determinant of economic 
growth with a positive effect. 
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 operates as a guide for the government on how to use its coercive power. As such, 
the rule of law cannot be measured on the same scale as other policy or 
institutional variables, because different economic policies or institutional settings 
bringing about the same final results can be evaluated differently through the lens 
of the rule of law. Briefly, the rule of law in this respect is rather the scale itself 
which is to be used to evaluate particular governmental actions, than a component 
of economic freedom (more details in Section 4). 
An advantage of relying on the Hayekian concept of freedom is that it 
explicitly, and what is more important, at a theoretical level, embodies the 
obvious link that exists between freedom and state coercion. This link is made 
evident by the scholars we referred to in the previous paragraphs, and since then it 
has become widely accepted among scholars in general. Accordingly, theorizing 
on economic freedom involves theorizing on the state (government), coercion and 
the rule of law. In what follows our aim will be to explore the relationship 
between them. 
 
3. Coercion, state, and freedom 
 
There are two general explanations for the state: social contract theory and 
predatory theory. The former, by its nature, presumes a state that does not reduce 
economic freedom as we understand it (for this reason we will not deal with this 
line of the theory), while the latter – suggesting that the state emerges out of the 
self-interested behavior of some agent with a comparative advantage in using 
force – asserts that state coercion can reduce economic freedom. In this 
perspective coercion, state and freedom are closely related. In this section we will 
explore this relationship. 
It follows from what we have already discussed that coercion is a crucial 
concept for making sense of freedom. In the traditional approach (e.g., Hobbes, 
Locke, Kant) coercion has commonly been understood as the use of a certain kind 
of power for the purpose of gaining advantages over others (including self-
protection), punishing non-compliance with demands, and imposing one's will on 
the will of other agents. In other words, it was viewed as capturing something and 
thus related to violence, compulsion, punishment, force, or interference, or the 
threat of these.7 
Hayek’s concept of coercion is in accordance with the above 
understanding: 
 
                                                 
7 Note that Nozick (1969) associates coercion only with proposals (e.g., conditional threats), and 
excludes the direct uses of force or violence which has, explicitly or implicitly, been adopted by 
many theorists, and has become the dominant strand (see also Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion/, accessed January 5, 2010). 
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 Coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s 
will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose. (Hayek, 1960:133) 
 
The coercer can determine the alternatives for the coerced so that the latter 
will choose what the coercer wants: “in order to avoid greater evil, he (the 
coerced – authors’ addition) is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of 
his own, but to serve the ends of another (the coercer – authors’ addition)” 
(Hayek, 1960:21).8 
As follows from what was said above, there are, of course, several forms of 
coercion, of which the threat of violence or physical force is the most important, 
and even in this form there are many degrees of coercion: 
 
True coercion occurs when armed bands of conquerors make the subject 
people toil for them, when organized gangsters extort a levy for 
‘protection’, … when the state threatens to inflict punishment and to 
employ physical force to make us obey its commands. (Hayek, 1960:137) 
 
Having said that, the important question is whether all forms of coercion 
are absolutely negative or whether it is in our interest to tolerate some kinds of 
coercion. History shows that institutionalized coercion by private (non-
governmental) parties is almost never tolerated, and is not morally acceptable, 
except when it arises from consent (Blake, 2001), but we tolerate governmental 
coercion. Why do we tolerate infringements of property and liberty rights by 
governments? The reason is that the coercive power of the state is useful when it 
protects our lives and property from private coercion. But what constitutes the 
state’s coercive power and what justifies a degree of state coercion? 
As one line of the literature (Barzel, 2000, 2002; Benson, 1998, 1999; 
Hayek, 1973; Holcombe, 2004; Olson, 1993, 2000; North et al., 2009) argues, all 
modern nation-states evolved from extortionist institutions, and states remain the 
primary threat to secure property rights, and accordingly, to (economic) freedom. 
However, on the other hand, as shown by Holcombe (2004) and Olson (2000), the 
government (state) is desirable, because it is less predatory than the bandits or 
mafias that would exist in the absence of a state. 
                                                 
8 Here it must be noted that Hamowy (1961) heavily criticized Hayek’s understanding of freedom 
as the absence of coercion, and in the framework of his criticism he attacked Hayek for the 
definition of coercion, too. In his answer to Hamowy, Hayek made it clearer what coercion means, 
by drawing a line between a coercive and non-coercive action: “To constitute coercion it is also 
necessary that the action of the coercer should put the coerced in a position which he regards as 
worse than that in which he would have been without that action” (Hayek, 1961:71). See also 
footnote 14. 
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 In the above-cited literature, the emergence of a government (state) with a 
coercive monopoly, or alternatively an ordered anarchy9 is explained in terms of 
an organic process in which some individuals develop a comparative advantage in 
violence. Violence is important because of scarcity, which, indeed, leads 
inevitably to a competition over the use of an asset. When numerous groups with 
coercive power (protection firms or Mafias) exist, clearly, they compete with each 
other, leading, as Nozick (1974) argues, to a natural monopoly in this industry. 
The way this process takes place is best explained by Olson (1993, 2000). 
At the end of the day, what this line of the literature shows is that the 
evolution of predatory (roving) bandits into stationary bandits (protection firms) 
and accordingly into governments is not only inevitable but is also desirable 
because the encompassing interest of the stationary bandit limits his predations, 
by securing individuals’ property rights. 
But the state must be seen as the primary source of threat for individuals’ 
freedom because as Weingast (1993, 1995) argues when the government is strong 
enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts, it is also strong enough to 
take the wealth of citizens.10 For our concern the major question is in which 
field(s) government coercion is allowed. Ultimately, the question at hand 
concerns the ends to which coercion may be put: What forms of coercion are 
justified? 
In a society organized as a state, individuals must tolerate some coercion – 
because “without some sort of state coercion, the very ability to autonomously 
pursue our projects and plans seems impossible” (Blake, 2001:280) –, this 
coercion is that of the state which protects us from the coercion of others: 
 
As far as the government … confines the exercise of its violence and the 
threat of such violence to the suppression and prevention of antisocial 
action, there prevails what reasonably and meaningfully is called liberty. 
(Mises, 1949:281) 
 
                                                 
9 Under ordered anarchy individuals develop private institutional solutions such as property rights 
or mutual insurance arrangements to address the problems that statelessness presents. Leeson 
(2008) provides an example of this in which he presents the well functioning private system of 
governance of pirates. Furthermore, Benson (1999) shows the conditions under which an ordered 
anarchy may appear to be quite stable, while Leeson (2007) does the same for those under which 
anarchy may be efficient. 
10 As argued in the institutional economics literature, the crucial thing is to have such institutions 
that credibly commit the state to constraining its own appropriation, and furthermore this 
commitment must be self-enforcing (Weingast, 1995). More precisely, the state itself must make 
credible commitments not to use its coercive force to extract too much of individuals’ surplus or 
property. A critical role of the constitution and other political institutions is precisely to place 
restrictions on the state (North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1997). 
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 Nevertheless, a paradox is that the only means whereby the state can 
prevent the coercion of one individual by another is the very threat of coercion, 
i.e., the only way to prevent one coercion is by the threat of another. In other 
words, the great difficulty is that coercion is both necessary and terrifying 
(Glaeser, 2007). Accordingly, freedom does not mean a total absence of state 
coercion. 
A conclusion from what was discussed above concerning the emergence 
of the state is that state coercion per se is not to be condemned: the only 
acceptable end to which government can use its coercive power is to protect us 
from private coercion. Having said that, the question is which means are 
acceptable for the government to employ its coercive power? This leads us to our 
second proposition derived from Hayek (1960) which has been already presented: 
the only acceptable means is enforcing general, abstract rules known beforehand, 
which are embodied in the principles of the rule of law.11 Thus, we argue that the 
rule of law is a set of principles that constitutes a criterion for an evaluation of 
coercive government actions from the viewpoint of economic freedom. This 
assertion, together with an unbundling of the content of economic freedom, will 
be developed in the next section. 
 
4. The content of economic freedom and the rule of law 
 
Although Hayek (1960, 1973) does not differentiate between various types of 
freedom, such as political or economic freedom (except for in his 1944[1971] 
book), his concept still provides a coherent basis for making sense of economic 
freedom. We argue that the adjective “economic” or “political” determines the 
fields in which we should narrow or specify the meaning of freedom understood 
broadly as absence of coercion except for state coercion to enforce general, 
abstract rules known beforehand. In this spirit, when it comes to economic 
freedom, state coercion should be understood as concerning the economic 
activities of individuals; more precisely their entrepreneurial acts. 
In a state of economic freedom individuals are allowed to use their 
knowledge for their own purposes in the course of making and realizing their 
plans in the market (Hayek, 1937). Put differently, individuals can exploit their 
productive potential by following their own plans and the opportunities to amass 
wealth safeguarded against confiscation (Barzel, 2000), i.e., they are able to have 
control over the residual of their productive efforts. The only constraint they have 
is that they are obliged to pay a certain share of their wealth (income) to the state, 
a share which is known beforehand; otherwise they are free to contract with any 
                                                 
11 Note that one should not confuse the Hayekian idea of a government relying on general rules 
which, as we argue, is an economic freedom issue with that of economic policy based on rules 
which is an economic policy issue. 
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 other individual in the market at any price. The crucial thing is that the state 
should allow people to rely on “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of 
time and place” (Hayek, 1945:521), because only individuals know these 
particular circumstances. 
Why is it so important that individuals be able to use their knowledge? 
The answer is rooted in what Hayek argued in his seminal 1945 paper: when 
individuals are allowed to mobilize their subjective, local knowledge, this leads to 
a situation in which the greatest possible advantages from trade can be achieved.12 
Put differently, a condition of economic freedom is that which gives all market 
participants the opportunity to act according to their own economic plans and use 
their skills and knowledge in the pursuit of their goals, i.e., deploying their 
entrepreneurial activities. The higher the level of economic freedom, the better 
consumer choices are satisfied and the greater the set of profitable production 
possibilities exploited. According to Hayek (1944[1971]), the competitive market 
process should be regarded as superior not only because it is the most efficient 
method to allocate resources, but even more because it is the only method by 
which individuals’ activities can be adjusted to each other without the coercive 
intervention of the government. 
Having stated this, supposing that the government eliminates all kinds of 
private coercion (except for that arising from consent), it is clear that it is only 
governmental coercion that can violate economic freedom. However, as already 
argued above, state coercion which serves to eliminate private coercion is useful. 
Then the question is how to separate these useful coercive actions of the state 
from those reducing economic freedom? In providing an answer to this question 
we should continue to follow Hayek’s (1960) argumentation: “When we obey 
laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their 
application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free” 
(Hayek, 1960:153), and “[s]uch a system is likely to be achieved and maintained 
only if all authority is limited in the exercise of coercive power by general 
principles” (Hayek, 1973:55). By general principles he means the rule of law: 
 
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those 
in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former 
of the great principles known as the Rule of Law. (Hayek, 1944[1971]:54) 
 
Thus, our argument is that the rule of law is a criterion against which one 
should evaluate coercive government actions from the viewpoint of economic 
freedom. 
                                                 
12 More precisely, this is the reverse interpretation of what Hayek (1945) said, but we believe 
Hayek’s original emphasis (that the competitive market process is the most efficient way to 
mobilize individuals’ knowledge) implies this, too. 
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 Although the rule of law is a historical concept suggesting some positive 
attributes, the concept is ambiguous and even legal scholars argue over its exact 
meaning. Fallon (1997) however, by identifying four ideal types of the rule of 
law, makes it clear that when various scholars treat it differently, they only 
prioritize the rule of law differently, reflecting the four ideal types. The Hayekian 
understanding of the rule of law reflects the procedural or formalist ideal type. 
The formalist (procedural) ideal type associates the rule of law with form, 
not substance, and implies that constitutional decision-making should be cast in 
the form of rules (see also Buchanan, 1999), which reflects the assumption that 
clear and determinate rules are necessary for both citizens and those in power. 
This understanding of the rule of law suggests at the same time that the rule of 
law must be distinguished from the rule of “good” law; that is, this strand of 
conceptualization of the rule of law by itself gives no indication what the 
substantive content of rules should be. As Cass (2004) argues, the rule of law does 
not assure that rules are wise or just or whatever; the focus of the rule of law is to 
assure law-bounded qualities. When rules are conceptualized in this way, the 
distinction between rules and standards is not always sharp; “ruleness” is a matter 
of degree (Fallon, 1997).13 
In sum, what is emphasized in the above conceptualization of the rule of 
law is government’s reliance on general, abstract rules known beforehand.14 
According to Hayek, the rule of law includes the following principles: (1) the 
certainty, (2) the generality and (3) the equality of the law. 
The certainty of law is probably the most important requirement for 
economic activities. It means that entrepreneurs can expect that today’s rules will 
be tomorrow’s rules, that is, the law is not subjected to sudden and unpredictable 
changes. Under the certainty of law individuals can make long-run plans (Leoni 
1961:95). 
                                                 
13 The significance of this for our framework will be clear when classifying coercive government 
actions. See Section 5. 
14 Here, as in footnote 8, Hamowy’s (1961) famous criticism must be dealt with once again. 
Besides the concept of coercion, the other major line of his criticism was against Hayek’s 
understanding of the rule of law as government reliance on general, abstract rules laid down 
beforehand. Hamowy argued that even rules which are general and abstract may still restrict 
individual liberty, and he gave conscription as an example. In fact, he tried to show that Hayek’s 
definition of freedom is not viable. Seemingly, Hamowy associated the rule of law with substance, 
which, in our view, should not be considered a “true” criticism vis-à-vis the Hayekian view, but 
rather another possible conceptualization (ideal type) of the rule of law (see Fallon, 1997 for the 
various ideal types of the rule of law). The fact that Hayek and Hamowy conceptualized the rule of 
law in a different way is highlighted not only in Hayek’s (1961) original response to Hamowy, but 
also in his 1973 book in which he referred once again to Hamowy (Hayek, 1973:101, footnote 10). 
However, as will become clear in Section 5, our framework for an understanding of economic 
freedom which differentiates between the criteria of economic freedom and efficiency may be 
useful when dealing with Hamowy’s problem of conscription and similar government actions. 
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 The generality of law means that the law never concerns particular 
individuals, i.e., law is abstract from the specific circumstances of time and place: 
“Abstract rules are not likely to be invented by somebody concerned with 
obtaining particular results” (Hayek, 1973:87). In other words, to be abstract the 
law must consist of purpose-independent rules governing the conduct of 
individuals towards each other, and apply to an unknown number of further 
instances by enabling an order of actions (Hayek, 1973). Thus, general abstract 
laws are long-term laws and are forward looking in their effect. 
Equality of the law means that all legal rules apply to everybody including 
to those in power. That is, every individual, whatever his or her rank, is subject to 
the ordinary law of the realm. More importantly, laws apply both to those who lay 
them down and those who apply them. As a result, the state is limited in the same 
manner as any private person. 
In addition to these three principles, as Leoni (1961) proposes, we should 
add another. This is the fact that administrative discretion in coercive power must 
always be subject to review by independent courts, that is, there must be some 
authority which is not concerned with any temporary aims of the government and 
which has the right to say whether another authority had the right to act as it did, 
and whether what it did was required by the law. 
Clearly, the rule of law tames the discretionary power of government and 
enables individuals to pursue their private ends. It gives us guidance to determine 
what kinds of coercive actions the government can take in an economically free 
country: specifically only those actions that conform to the principles of the rule 
of law (understood as described above).15 
Under the rule of law individuals are able to form plans based on their 
knowledge, since laws are data for them, which can be accounted for, and the 
content of the law itself is irrelevant from this perspective, as was argued above.16 
In sum, for our concern the rule of law consists of “rules fixed and announced 
beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances, and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge” (Hayek, 1944[1971]:54). 
The major conclusion from the above discussion is that under conditions 
of economic freedom government coercion is restricted to that coercion which 
aims at enforcing abstract, general rules known beforehand. 
                                                 
15 Note that Hayek clearly associated the rule of law with the common law: “such law, which like 
the common law, emerges from the judicial process is necessarily abstract in the sense that the law 
created by the commands of the ruler need not be so” (Hayek, 1973:86). For a detailed account of 
the historical evolution of the rule of law in the Anglo-Saxon tradition (England and the US) see 
for instance North et al. (2009) or for a short but excellent one see Johnson (2008). 
16 Note however that the content of the law is important from the viewpoint of efficiency. See 
argumentation in Section 5. 
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 5. Types of government actions and economic freedom 
 
As suggested above, the coercive actions conforming to the rule of law are useful 
and foster economic freedom because they allow individuals to make plans and 
realize them on the market. We call them freedom-compatible coercive activities. 
But when government coercion is not restricted to coercive actions based on 
general rules, these arbitrary government activities hamper or distort individuals’ 
entrepreneurial activity, and accordingly economic freedom is hurt. We call them 
freedom-non-compatible coercive activities. Let us consider these two kinds of 
coercive actions of government in more detail. 
Freedom-compatible activities include first of all those coercive activities 
which serve to protect individuals from private coercion, such as the enforcement 
of contracts, an independent judiciary, the security of property rights, national 
security, etc. These coercive actions of the government are prerequisites for 
individuals’ entrepreneurial actions to take place, therefore they are useful, an 
argument which is given strong theoretical and empirical underpinnings in the 
literature, too (e.g., Boettke and Coyne, 2003, 2006; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2008; 
Harper, 2003). 
On the other hand, those general regulations and standards that are laid 
down in the form of rules specifying a certain type of activity, conforming ideally 
to the principles of the rule of law must be considered freedom-compatible 
activities, too.17 These regulations may concern for instance the techniques of 
production by limiting the scope of experimentation, or by prohibiting some 
activities for reasons of health, or by permitting other activities only when certain 
precautions are taken, or by prohibiting the use of certain materials, and so forth. 
These regulations, as is also argued by Hayek (1944[1971]) himself are fully 
compatible with the preservation of market competition, i.e., economic freedom. 
The only question here is whether the benefits are greater than the social costs 
they impose, since these regulations raise the cost of production. This evaluation, 
however, is made not according to the criterion of economic freedom, but that of 
efficiency18: some work regulations must be rejected on grounds of efficiency, 
                                                 
17 As argued in the previous section, in the formalist ideal type of the rule of law, which we adopt, 
there is no sharp distinction between rules and standards. 
18 It is worth noting that Hayek himself talks about “expediency”, a concept which is not clearly 
defined and seems to include such additional criteria as fairness, or justice, or efficiency. Instead 
of expediency we adhere to the term “efficiency” for reasons developed in Colombatto (2007). 
One example of a conflict between the two criteria (freedom or efficiency) is shown by the debate 
over Richard Epstein’s theory of strict liability as opposed to the negligence theory in tort law 
(Fay, 1992). By emphasizing the priority of the original assignment of property rights Epstein’s 
theory of strict liability seems to be in line with economic freedom, although in some cases it 
might not be efficient. The reverse is true in the case of negligence theory. 
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 although these do not hamper individuals in making and realizing their plans on 
the market (more details below). 
The other group of coercive actions is that of freedom-non-compatible 
actions which the rule of law excludes in principle. Here there are those coercive 
activities of the government which cannot be achieved by enforcing abstract rules, 
but which involve arbitrary discrimination between people. Hayek (1960) is rather 
implicit on which government actions belong to this category, but in our view 
basically three types of actions emerge from his discussion. First, all kinds of 
controls such as price, quantity and wage control are of this type. These represent 
a kind of infringement of the individual’s private sphere which is an obstacle to 
individuals freely contracting with each other. Furthermore, government 
monopolies on markets other than that of public goods harm economic freedom, 
too, because they prevent individuals from taking entrepreneurial actions on these 
markets. In fact, in this case the Hayekian principle that the government, except 
for the monopoly of coercion, should operate “on the same terms as anybody 
else” (Hayek, 1960:223), would be broken. In our view, the third type of freedom-
non-compatible coercive activities is government subsidies to particular firms 
(private or state) and various transfers which are designed to achieve some 
specific purposes, and accordingly arbitrarily differentiate between agents. 
Clearly, these contradict the principles of the equality and generality of the law. 
Transfers and subsidies in this case should be seen as coercive actions because 
those who receive particular subsidies are forced to behave not according to their 
plans but according to the government’s will (Hayek, 1960): subsidies are usually 
provided for a given purpose (R&D, exportation, etc.), and many transfers are not 
for free use (e.g., food stamp or housing benefits). In addition, very often, 
subsidies and transfers are provided based on concrete, particular rules, and not 
general, abstract rules conforming to the rule of law. Furthermore, due to, for 
instance, frequent changes in transfer and subsidies policy, individuals cannot 
foresee the action of the state with fair certainty. One reason for this is that the 
willingness of the government to grant money to any interest group will increase 
the expected profit from lobbying for such grants for all the other interest groups 
as Tullock (1967) pointed out decades ago. The outcome of this competition for 
grants is increasingly uncertain the more interest groups are involved. 
So far, we have focused on coercive government actions, but not all 
government actions are coercive in character. Government undertakes some 
“purely service activities” (Hayek, 1960:144), too, which are non-coercive. These 
include the provision of those “services which otherwise would not be supplied at 
all” (Hayek, 1960:222), such as for instance care for the disabled, the provision of 
roads or of information, etc.19 It is true, however, that the only means by which 
                                                 
19 Note that this group of government actions is not identical with public goods, most importantly 
because public goods include coercive activities, too, such as enforcement of property rights and 
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 these services can be financed is taxation, which is coercive. But, we argue that a 
government action has to be evaluated in terms of the character of the action 
itself, rather than how it is financed.20 When evaluating a government action 
according to whether it reduces economic freedom, the emphasis on the character 
of the action itself provides us with a criterion referring to the feasibility of 
individuals’ entrepreneurial actions, a criterion which would be missing when 
interpreting a coercive action in terms of coercive financing. To give an example, 
in terms of financing all government actions are of the same type, namely 
coercive, but in terms of the character of government actions, for instance the 
care for the disabled does not prevent anybody from making and realizing a plan 
on the market, accordingly it is a non-coercive action, while rent control distorts 
prices and hinders certain market transactions, accordingly it is a freedom-non-
compatible coercive action. 
What is important from the viewpoint of economic freedom is that 
government services (non-coercive government actions) do not concern economic 
freedom, while they influence the size of the government. The extent of 
government services and the taxes financing them matters, but from the viewpoint 
of efficiency. We argue that “efficiency” and “economic freedom” are criteria in 
their own right, providing different viewpoints for evaluating government actions. 
Efficiency is a criterion on the basis of which all government actions, both 
coercive and non-coercive, can and must be evaluated, while economic freedom is 
only concerned with evaluating coercive government actions. In this way 
efficiency is related to the size of government, while economic freedom is 
concerned with the character of government actions. In other words, the size of 
the government – which is the result of both coercive and non-coercive 
government actions – does not necessarily hurt economic freedom, while nothing 
guarantees that the government carries out its actions in an efficient way. That is, 
a government action can harm both economic freedom and efficiency, as for 
instance freedom-incompatible actions can; but an action harming efficiency may 
                                                                                                                                     
contracts, and an independent judiciary, which we categorize as freedom-compatible coercive 
actions (see above). 
20 This is the reason why we did not mention taxation among the coercive government actions: a 
coercive action for us means “coercive in character of the action itself”, and not coercively 
financed. (See Hayek (1960:222) which is in line with our argument). What is more, seeing taxes 
that are raised to finance freedom-non-compatible government actions as a factor reducing 
economic freedom would be a “duplication”, once the freedom-non-compatible actions are seen as 
such. As for the freedom-compatible actions, since they do not reduce economic freedom, neither 
should the taxes financing them be seen as a reducing factor. Mises (1949:282), arguing that 
taxation for the purpose of financing such government apparatus as courts, police, armed forces, 
etc. is compatible with freedom seems to support our view. Note however that both indexes of 
economic freedom explicitly see taxation as reducing economic freedom, a point which is 
criticized in De Haan and Sturm (2000). 
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 not harm economic freedom as, for instance, non-coercive and freedom-
compatible coercive actions may. In the spirit of Hayek, it is also clear that 
hampering economic freedom is more harmful than acting in an inefficient way: 
 
… [A] government that is comparatively inactive but does the wrong 
things may do much more to cripple the forces of a market economy than 
one that is more concerned with economic affairs but confines itself to 
actions which assist the spontaneous forces of the economy. (Hayek, 
1960:222).21 
 
So an evaluation of government action against the criterion of economic 
freedom must come first, and an evaluation against efficiency only second. Table 
1 summarizes the types of government actions in relation to the two evaluation 
criteria. 
 
Coercive actions Non-coercive 
actions 
Economic freedom criterion: conformity to the rule of law  
Freedom-compatible actions 
(conforming to the rule of law) 
Freedom-non-compatible actions 
(not conforming to the rule of law) 
 
Rules Regulations, 
standards 
Rules Regulations, 
standards 
 
Efficiency criterion: cost – benefit analysis 
Can be efficient or inefficient Efficiency criterion may apply, but 
they must be refuted solely on the 
basis of economic freedom 
criterion 
Can be efficient 
or inefficient 
 
Table 1: Government actions and the two evaluation criteria 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tried to answer the question of how to conceptualize 
economic freedom in a useful way when accepting the classical liberal notion that 
                                                 
21 Vanberg (2004:4) interprets this in the following way: Hayek meant “to say that we must 
distinguish between the issue of whether we consider particular policy measures as desirable or 
undesirable and the issue of whether they are compatible or, in principle, incompatible with a 
market order”. 
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 some (kind of) government intervention is needed to maintain economic freedom. 
How and where should we draw the line separating those actions of the 
government that are the prerequisites of economic freedom from those that hurt 
it? Based on Hayek’s statement that “[t]he rule of law provides the criterion 
which enables us to distinguish between those measures which are and those 
which are not compatible with a free system” (Hayek, 1960:222) we explicitly 
argued that the question of the extent of economic freedom is reduced to the 
question of how the government uses its coercive power. Thus, in this spirit, we 
put the rule of law in its Hayekian sense at the center of the conceptualization of 
economic freedom as a criterion to separate those coercive actions that are 
necessary for economic freedom (freedom-compatible coercive actions) from 
those that reduce it (freedom-non-compatible coercive actions). We think this 
distinction can help us give a better understanding of how and why economic 
growth is affected by economic freedom and by government actions in general. 
A long-standing theoretical issue in growth economics is how to 
differentiate between level effects and growth effects of different variables 
including those of government intervention. In the neoclassical framework 
(Solow, 1956) there is no growth effect of government interventions, while in the 
new growth theory some parameters which are hypothesized as being set by the 
government may even have a long-term effect on growth (Jones, 2005; Barro, 
1990). This question is also raised in the empirical literature on economic 
freedom and growth (e.g., De Haan and Sturm, 2000). We think our idea of using 
the concept of the rule of law to separate two kinds of coercive government 
actions is helpful in this respect and leads us to propose that the lack or bad 
“quality” of freedom-compatible coercive actions of the government is the most 
harmful because these actions can reduce the growth of income and not only its 
level. The reason behind this proposition, which we think deserves further 
research, is that freedom-compatible coercive actions of the government (e.g., 
protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts, etc.) create an 
environment which makes individual entrepreneurial acts possible: such an 
environment is what is needed in the first place for entrepreneurs to be able to 
discover and realize productive profit opportunities on the market (Kirzner, 1973). 
Furthermore, the idea of separating freedom-compatible coercive actions 
from those that are incompatible with economic freedom may help formulate 
hypotheses concerning how institutions that are the results of various 
governmental actions co-evolve with economic development. As it was argued by 
Ludwig von Mises (1940[1998]) government intervention is a self-generating 
process, because one interventionist act will create an unexpected market reaction 
making the government conduct newer acts to cure it and so on. Here the question 
can be raised, what are those government acts that generate this spiral of ever 
further interventions and what are those acts that are needed to institutionalize the 
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 market process. Recognizing that the market process, i.e., the discovery and 
realization of profit opportunities (Kirzner, 1973), is part of the process of 
economic development can lead to a new perspective on the institutional 
conditions of progress. 
More precisely, the theoretical framework we have derived in this paper 
may serve as a building block in an entrepreneurial (market process) 
interpretation of the question of which institutions of economic freedom are the 
exogenous conditions of economic development and which are those that are 
endogenously determined by development. That is, our categorization of coercive 
government actions gives us principles for how to disaggregate or restructure an 
economic freedom index for an empirical investigation of the endogeneity 
problem in the development process.22 Following this argument further, a 
hypothesis suggested by our paper is the following. It is clearly the institutions 
resulting from the freedom-compatible government actions (e.g., secure property 
rights, enforcement of contract) that are the exogenous conditions of economic 
development, because, as suggested by a large literature (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Benson, 1999; Hayek, 1960) they are shaped by historical-cultural factors 
that are outside the process of development.  
As opposed to this, freedom-non-compatible government actions are to a 
large extent the results of the development process itself: as countries get richer, 
they are more prone to apply measures that hurt freedom (e.g., transfers and 
subsidies), but they are also prone to eliminate some others (e.g., controls). As a 
result, what really differentiates between rich and poor countries, in terms of 
economic freedom, is not the extent of the freedom-non-compatible coercive 
actions they take, but the extent to which their governments behave in a freedom-
compatible way. 
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